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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The literature on foreign fighters devotes considerable attention to the questions of why individuals join 
armed groups outside of their nation-states and their propensity for engaging in political violence after 
they return to their home countries. But what happens to those who do not return but go on to join new 
groups, or even new wars?
This paper examines career foreign fighters1 who have traversed from one insurgency to another. We 
present an original dataset of over 50 individuals who served as foreign fighters in multiple insurgencies. 
More than half of those who could be identified as having served with more than one armed group 
achieved leadership positions, which is historically atypical for foreign fighters. Some become top leader-
ship while a significant percentage also facilitate terror attacks.
The Syrian conflict has produced a policy debate about whether it is more dangerous to allow foreign 
fighters to return or to leave them unaccounted. This study provides the first evidence that foreign 
fighters who survive their first tours accumulate resources, develop skills, and transfer their abilities 
to new violent actors. Our findings indicate that career foreign fighters pose a greater and broader 
security threat than returning, one-off foreign fighters. 
INTRODUCTION
Foreign fighters have been a preeminent international security challenge of the twenty-first century. 
They have been a facet of civil wars throughout modern history. The presence of tens of thousands of for-
eign fighters in current conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere raised concerns that some will return to 
home countries to perpetrate domestic terrorism or radicalize the next generation of extremists. These 
previsions created international disputes about how to address prisoners and returnees. But the binary 
debate over whether foreign fighters are more of a threat if they return or if they stay misses an import-
ant factor: those who continue on to become career foreign fighters.  
While research on foreign fighters has focused on cycles of recruitment, fighting, and returning, there 
have been foreign fighters throughout history who have instead gone from one conflict to another. Some 
of these individuals have crossed ideological boundaries, fighting for groups aligned with mutually exclu-
sive communist, ethnic, and jihadist ideologies.2 To illustrate, one individual who served in multiple con-
flicts around the African Great Lakes clearly established himself as a career foreign fighter, reporting he 
had served in seven different groups and adhered to the ideologies of all of them, including nationalist 
1 The authors use the term “foreign fighter” in this report. The term “foreign terrorist fighter” (FTF) can also be used to denote the indi-
viduals described herein. 
2 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 171, 227-231. https://
doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199939459.001.0001.
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parties from different countries.3 While some professional adventurers or mercenaries might serve with 
several armed groups or with the same organization in multiple theaters of conflict, typically professional 
mercenaries do not become career foreign fighters because insurgencies do not pay as well or reliably. 4
This study examines individual jihadists who served as foreign fighters in multiple groups, building 
“careers” across multiple conflicts, with evidence that many enjoy career progression from foot soldiers 
to top leadership. It presents data on more than 50 career foreign fighters and case studies of three who 
served in multiple conflicts and became influential in the jihadist movement globally. Prior analysis of for-
eign fighters has not focused specifically on career foreign fighters. Our analysis, however, indicates that 
career foreign fighters can have a significant impact far beyond just the conflicts in which they choose to 
fight. Given the breadth of their reach, greater understanding of the motivations, lived experiences, and 
lasting impact of career foreign fighters is needed to develop more effective counterinsurgency (COIN) 
and countering violent extremism (CVE) programs and policies.
To assess the impact of career foreign fighters, it is necessary to delineate the individuals examined. We 
adopt the definition of foreign fighters as non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil 
conflicts.5 We therefore measure the careers of individuals who fought with non-state insurgent groups 
during civil wars. We do not examine participation in multiple domestic extremist groups or the spatial 
movement of the members of terrorist networks. 
FOREIGN FIGHTERS & FOREIGN CONFLICTS: 
EXAMINING CURRENT KNOWLEDGE
Becoming a Foreign Fighter: Pathways & Motivations
To understand the career development of foreign fighters in conflict zones, we must first understand who 
leaves to become a foreign fighter. This question of the who, why, and how has inspired many scholars, 
mostly to conduct case studies.6 Consensus seems to exist around the how question: in the majority of 
3 United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, “Combatants on Foreign Soil: An Assessment of their Current Status and of Mea-
sures to Facilitate their Disarmament, Repatriation, and Inclusion in National Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes,” UNOSAA 
Issue Paper (2007): 19.
4 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 9.
5 Ibid.
6 Daan Weggemans, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol, “Who Are They and Why Do They Go: The Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of 
Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 4 (2014): 100-10; Daniel H. Heinke and Jan Raudszus, “German Foreign 
Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 1 (2015): 18-21; Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western For-
eign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no.1 (2015): 1-22, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.974948; 
Adrian Shtuni, “Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 4 (2015): 11-14; Marco Nilsson, “Foreign Fighters 
and the Radicalization of Local Jihad: Interview Evidence from Swedish Jihadists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, vol.5 (2015): 343-58, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1005459; Edwin Bakker and Roel De Bont, “Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–
2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, vol. 5 (2016): 837-57, https://
doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1209806; Francesco Marone, “Italian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq,” Contemporary Voices: St Andrews 
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cases, social networks and facilitators are the key factors in explaining mobilization.7 Foreign fighters 
mostly travel in (small) groups of friends and relatives and are often part of social networks with other 
(prospective) foreign fighters. Less consensus exists around the questions of who joins and why. When 
it comes to ideological motivations, we know that foreign fighters travel to fight in  defense of a trans-
national community perceived to be under existential threat.8 In terms of personal motivations, a wide 
variety of reasons—including those that are more worldly or material in nature—play a role in explaining 
who joins the fight and who does not. Consequently, establishing a universal profile for foreign fighters, 
as for terrorists, is probably futile.9
Further complicating the matter is that foreign fighters come from widely different contexts and back-
grounds. Most current research is devoted to understanding Western foreign fighters, particularly the 
thousands of Europeans who have joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq since 2012. While descriptions 
of European foreign fighters might be useful in explaining the characteristics of fighters from a partic-
ular European country, these findings cannot be extrapolated to other geographical regions. Questions 
regarding who the thousands of foreign fighters originating from countries in North Africa and the Mid-
dle East or former Soviet Republics are or why they joined the fight elicit answers distinct from those 
of their European counterparts. Plenty of examples, outlined below, underscore the variety in foreign 
fighter backgrounds and motivations. 
For instance, Vera Mironova interviewed foreign fighters for her book From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists: 
Human Resources of Non-State Armed Groups (2019). Chechen fighters in Syria told her that “Syria is a 
good training ground, but we are keeping our eye on the situation in Chechnya, and as soon as Kadirov 
[Head of the Chechen Republic] or Putin die, we will go back.”10 For those fighters, some of whom already 
had previous fighting experience, going to Syria was a strategic, long-term decision in preparation for a 
more important battle. Unlike their Chechen counterparts, however, fighters from Central Asian Repub-
lics seemed to join as a result of social and economic grievances. According to Mironova, many Central 
Asian Republic fighters first worked in Russia, where they suffered from dire socio-economic conditions 
and felt discriminated against and marginalized.11 Studies on the various foreign fighters emanating from 
European countries again illustrate a different picture. Many European fighters had links to “nonviolent 
Journal of International Relations 7, vol. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1205; Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “The Foreign Fighter 
Phenomenon: Case Study of the Netherlands,” in Not Only Syria? The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters in a Comparative Perspective, ed. 
Kacper Rekawek (NATO IOS Press, 2017), 1-11.
7 Based on Marc Sageman’s “bunch of guys” observation, see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Timothy Holman,”’Gonna Get Myself Connected’: The Role of Facilitation in 
Foreign Fighter Mobilizations,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, vol. 2 (2016): 2-23; Sean C. Reynolds and Mohammed M. Hafez, “Social 
Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no.4 (2019): 661-86, https://doi.org
/10.1080/09546553.2016.1272456.
8 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 4. 
9 Holman, “‘Gonna Get Myself Connected’,” 3.
10 Vera Mironova, From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists: Human Resources of Non-State Armed Groups, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 112, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190939755.001.0001.
11 Mironova, From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists, 111.
RESOLVE RESEARCH REPORT  |  CAREER FOREIGN FIGHTERS           5
but extreme organizations or preachers before they embraced violence.”12 On a country level, Dutch 
fighters, for instance, were mostly under the age of 25, with middle and low education levels, originating 
from low or lower middle-class socio-economic backgrounds.13
Over the past years, more attention has been paid to the so-called crime-terror-nexus—the assumed 
overlap between terrorist and criminal networks in Europe. Recent studies have pointed at the high 
proportion of European jihadists who already had careers in crime prior to becoming foreign fighters,14 
which has implications for the skills they possess. Foreign fighters with criminal pasts can use their crim-
inal skills for terrorist purposes and might already be more familiar with violence.15 A criminal past could 
also affect the motives for becoming a foreign fighter. For example, seeking redemption for past criminal 
sins might be one of the core motives of these criminals-turned-terrorists.16 
Contributing to the Conflict: Varied Skillsets & Experiences 
While the backgrounds and experience levels of foreign fighters may vary, many studies argue that for-
eign fighters only rarely bring extensive skillsets and experience to the conflict. For instance, Arab fighters 
that joined local Afghan fighters to combat the Soviet Union in the 1980s were described as rich Gulf 
kids without any fighting experience, often traveling to the conflict for only a few weeks during their 
summer holidays.17 Interestingly, the military contribution of foreign fighters to the Afghan conflict has 
been called “not particularly significant, their number miniscule in comparison to the local conflict.”18 
Similarly, the first wave of foreign fighters who arrived in Bosnia in the early 1990s mostly lacked real 
fighting experience.19 
However, in some cases, studies have shown that foreign fighters have brought significant skills and 
knowledge to their adopted conflicts. While, as noted above, the first wave of foreign fighters who joined 
the Bosnian war were relatively unskilled, the second wave, comprised of many commanders from the 
conflict in Afghanistan, brought useful experience to the Bosnian fight.20 Similarly, of Chechen fighters 
who traveled to Syria, few could be considered “first-timers.”21 Rather, the Chechens fighting in Syria 
12 Daniel Byman, Road Warriors (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019), 218.
13 Weggemans, Bakker, and Grol, “Who Are They and Why Do They Go,” 107.
14 Rekawek et al, European Jihad: future of the Past? From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Final Report (Bratislava: GLOBSEC, 2019), 5.
15 Rajan Basra and Peter R. Neumann, “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus,” Perspectives 
on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016): 26.
16 Basra and Neumann, “Criminal Pasts, Terrorists Futures,” 26.
17 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: IB Tauris & Co LTD, 2004), 76.
18 Barak Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters - Recent Trends,” Orbis (Spring 2011): 90, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2011.01.002.
19 Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, Returning Western Foreign Fighters: The Case of Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Somalia 
(The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014), https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-De-Roy-van-Zuijdewijn-Bakker-
Returning-Western-Foreign-Fighters-June-2014.pdf.
20 Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “Fearing the Western Muslim Foreign Fighter: The Connection Between Fighting the Defensive Jihad and 
Terrorist Activity in the West” (MA diss., University of Utrecht, 2014), 58.
21 Neil Hauer, “Chechen and North Caucasian Militants in Syria,” The Atlantic Council (2018).
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were comprised mostly of experienced (foreign) fighters, some of whom had ascended into leadership 
positions and brought useful skillsets and experience with them.22 
Clearly, individuals with fighting expertise can prove useful for the groups they join. Such expertise could 
also explain why certain individuals rise within the ranks of those groups. First-time foreign fighters 
following similar trajectories can also become experienced fighters with useful skills and knowledge.23 
In addition to previous experience, the ability of individuals to learn, grow, and adapt to changing cir-
cumstances in conflict zones might be equally, if not more, important to understand which fighters will 
assume positions of leadership. As summarized by Mendelsohn, a fighter’s “rise is a function not only of 
personal charisma or reputation (...), but mostly of knowledge accumulated through experience, often 
via activity in a number of locations or prolonged service in one arena.”24
Interacting with Local Dynamics: A Resource or a Liability?
Whereas many scholars have studied the motivations of foreign fighters and the potential threat they 
may pose upon return, far less attention has been paid to the impact of foreign fighters on the con-
flicts they join.25 Kristin Bakke authored one of the few in-depth studies focused on fighters’ impact in 
local contexts. In her study, Bakke notes that the conflict in Syria had raised many questions and wor-
ries about the influence of foreign fighters, “[y]et despite these policy concerns, little scholarship has 
explored the ways in which transnational insurgents, once they arrive, influence domestic struggles.”26 As 
Bakke explains, the influx of foreign fighters into a conflict can have different outcomes: it “might boost 
a domestic insurgent movement’s strength by bringing along fighters, weapons, know-how, and financial 
resources,” as is often assumed, but “they can also jeopardize a domestic movement’s strength.”27 The 
latter can be explained by tensions between the local population and foreign fighters, which could lead 
to less support for the insurgent organization or even internal divisions or splintering. Bakke mentions 
the example of the Chechen resistance movement from which factions split off around 1999 as a result 
of disagreement on the question to what extent they were fighting a nationalist or global Islamist bat-
22 Ibid.
23	 See	also	the	discussion	on	non-jihadist	fighters	in:	Arkadiusz	Legieć,	“The	Risks	of	Foreign	Fighters	in	the	Ukraine-Russia	Conflict,”	PISM 
Bulletin, no. 150 (2019), 2.
24 Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters -Recent Trends,” 195.
25 The literature on motivations has been discussed in the previous section. For literature on the threat posed by returnees, see for 
instance: Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic 
and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 1–15; Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “The Foreign Fighters’ 
Threat: What History Can(not) Tell Us,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (2014); Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be a Little 
Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq (Brookings, 2014); Daniel Byman, “The Homecomings: 
What Happens When Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 8 (2015): 581-602; Phil 
Gurski, Western Foreign Fighters: The Threat to Homeland and International Security (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Alastair 
Reed, Johanna Pohl, Marjolein Jegerings, The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat: Making Sense of an Evolving Phenomenon 
(The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017); David Malet and Rachel Hayes, “Foreign Fighter Returnees: An Indefinite 
Threat?,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2018): 1-19.
26 Kristin Bakke, “Help Wanted? The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014): 
150, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00156..
27 Bakke, “Help Wanted?” 185.
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tle.28 More recent examples include the split-off of the Syrian-focused al-Nusra Front from Al Qaeda in 
Iraq and tensions within al-Shabaab leading to splinter groups.29 Clint Watts argues that splintering is no 
exception: “When defeats outnumber victories and objectives appear unattainable, fractures routinely 
form between local and foreign fighters. Locals with a post-conflict stake in the region rapidly break 
with foreign volunteers who lack local alternatives”.30 These examples indicate that the effect of foreign 
fighters on domestic movements is not always positive and outright negative when it leads to in-fighting 
between factions.
Another potential consequence of the influx of foreign fighters is the internationalization of the con-
flict, drawing in other parties that support or fight them or use their presence “as an excuse to escalate 
a pre-existing conflict with local or regional adversaries.”31 This has also been shown in the context of 
foreign fighters in Chechnya and Syria: they “have had a catastrophic impact on international and domes-
tic perceptions of the opposition” and affected the power balance as groups preferred to support the 
known government rather than an unstable and unreliable jihadist fighting force.32 In cases like these, the 
presence of foreign fighters can often have negative effects. There are also indications pointing to a more 
hybrid logic when it comes to the debate about foreign fighters as resource or nuisance. Their usefulness 
as a resource is dependent on the extent of their commitment or alignment to the cause.33 
The effects foreign fighters have on local conflicts are not always unidirectional or easy to measure. A 
study by Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty on the influence of foreign fighters in Chechnya warns against 
simplified explanations. For instance, it cannot be claimed that the use of suicide attacks during the 
Second Chechen War (1999-2009) was a direct result of the influx of foreign fighters.34 Rather, they state 
that this was “symptomatic of the changing nature of the indigenous resistance and the society of which 
it is a product.”35 They also show how external factors greatly affected the relative strength of the foreign 
fighter movement in Chechnya.36 Other studies have found that the presence of foreign fighters makes 
insurgencies more likely to use violence against civilians, and markedly more when they do not share 
close ethnic or kinship ties with the local populations, which jihadists typically lack because their net-
works are organized based on religion.37  
28 Bakke, “Help Wanted?” 177.
29 Ben Rich and Dara Conduit, “The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters on Indigenous Secular-Nationalist Causes: Contrasting Chechnya and 
Syria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 2 (2014): 121; Clint Watts, “Deciphering Competition Between al-Qa’ida and the Islamic 
State,” CTC Sentinel (July 2016): 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.979605.
30 Watts, “Deciphering Competition Between al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State,” 2.
31 Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “Terrorism and Beyond: Exploring the Fallout of the European Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Syria and 
Iraq,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10. no. 6 (2016): 83.
32 Ben Rich and Dara Conduit, “The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters on Indigenous Secular-Nationalist Causes: Contrasting Chechnya and 
Syria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 2 (2014): 125.
33 Tiffany S. Chu and Alex Braithwaite, “The Impact of Foreign Fighters on Civil Conflict Outcomes,” Research and Politics 1 (2017): 6.
34 Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
31, no. 5 (2008): 425, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610080199334.
35 Ibid, 425.
36 Ibid, 427.
37 Pauline Moore, “When Do Ties Bind? Foreign Fighters, Social Embeddedness, and Violence against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 
56, no. 2 (2019): 12-14, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318804594.
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Mendelsohn critically commented on the relevance of Western foreign fighters in (pre-2010) conflicts, 
stating that they “are not only insignificant for the fighting effort; they may even become a liability. 
Instead of a force multiplier on the front, many need the equivalent of babysitting.”38 There are many 
indications that this has been different in the case of the thousands of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq 
over the past years. They have shown to be an important asset or resource for the Islamic State, which 
has actively recruited many Western foreign fighters.39
REMAINING KNOWLEDGE GAPS:AREAS FOR 
FURTHER EXAMINATION
The “mixed record”40 of the impact of foreign fighters both between and within conflicts underlines the 
importance of recognizing the significance of local context and dynamics over time, as well as the path-
ways of individual foreign fighters once they have joined the conflict. As outlined above, existing studies 
have shed some much-needed light on the effects that foreign fighters as a group might have on the 
conflict. Still, little is known about these individual trajectories. One issue in need of further examination 
is the role of foreign fighters in terrorist organizations and the future use of their experience and skills. 
This question is therefore not merely relevant for the debate on returning foreign fighters. Fighters might 
use their experience in different conflicts or different organizations. Recent literature indicates that many 
leaders of jihadist organizations had previous transnational fighting experience.41 Little is known about 
the trajectories of such veteran fighters and their career paths. Getting a better understanding of how 
such veteran fighters might use their previous experience to climb the ranks and apply their skills and 
experience in different conflicts is, therefore, much needed. 
Further expanding the knowledge base on career foreign fighters is not only relevant for the academic 
debate, it also has policy implications. For instance, further information on career foreign fighters could 
help clarify the potential implications posed by veteran foreign fighters joining new battle zones as well 
as how their migration to new conflicts could affect local conflict cycles. In addition, further study of 
career foreign fighters can also expand evidence-based insights to inform what is now a highly-politicized 
debate in Western countries—whether to repatriate and assist in the return of foreign fighters to their 
home countries. Expanding the knowledge base could help assess the implications of foreign fighters 
staying abroad and potentially joining other or future conflicts.
38 Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters - Recent Trends,” 195.
39 Colin Clarke, After the Caliphate (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 54.
40 Inspired by the title of Bakke’s article.
41 Daan Weggemans and Lennart van Leeuwen, “Characteristics of Jihadist Terrorist Leaders: A Quantitative Approach,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 12, no. 4 (2018): 63.
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Switching Groups: Foreign Fighter Migration Between 
Violent Extremist Groups
An unexamined niche of career foreign fighters are militants who move between allied fighting groups. 
While there have been studies of individuals who defect during war time or who join rival insurgent or 
extremist groups due to fragmentation, there has been relatively little research to date on individuals 
who switch from one allied group to another that is fighting on the same side. Typically, motivations for 
switching between groups that are otherwise fighting on the same side are ascribed to differences in the 
groups’ material or social incentives.42
Explaining how foreign fighters choose which group to join, Vera Mironova posits that “those leading 
groups will most likely portray themselves as ideological.”43 The most ideological and committed groups, 
therefore, could be considered the most successful in attracting foreign fighters. As in any organization, 
Mironova notes that qualified leadership is the most important factor in “developing successful human 
resources policies” contributing to positive fighter experiences in a group and to the group’s attractive-
ness to potential recruits.44
Paul Staniland further argues that rebel leaders can either build upon deeply integrated “vertical” ties to 
local communities or must rely on more dispersed “horizontal” ties to ideological networks elsewhere.45 
Those who have neither must compensate with a small, dedicated “vanguard,” or a tightly structured, 
small cadre of leaders, and hope to build strength quickly.46 While some insurgents in history have 
attempted the vanguard strategy—Che Guevara was perhaps the most prominent—jihadist foreign fight-
ers have always benefitted from transnational ties. Jihadist foreign fighters do not usually arrive in new 
theaters of conflict without references and resources.47 
There is also competition for recruits and resources between, on the one hand, established foreign fighter 
groups that have arrived from prior conflicts to a new location and, on the other hand, local groups that 
already exist in that location. In some instances when career foreign fighter groups have supplanted local 
insurgent groups, they have been perceived by local populations to be more effective and reliable.48 
42 Julie Chernov Hwang, “Understanding the Changing Landscape of Islamist Extremism in Indonesia,” Paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, ON (2019): 2-4; Stathis Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil Wars,” Comparative 
Political Studies 41, no. 8 (2008); Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical 
Organizations in the Middle East,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no.1 (2012): 94-117; Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, “Terrorist Factions,” 
Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3, no. 4 (2008): 399-418.
43 Mironova, From Freedom Fighters to Jihadist, 46.
44 Ibid., 15.
45 Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
46 Ibid., 26-31.
47 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 195.
48 Jasper Schwampe, “Muslim Foreign Fighters in Armed Conflicts” (PhD Dissertation, Aarhus Universitet, 2018), 54, 62-64.
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Insurgencies that have foreign fighters appear to last longer than those that do not—the former’s odds 
of long-term survival are nearly double that of the latter.49 While the first generations of transnational 
jihadists built networks in training camps, newer foreign fighters and supporters are linked by a com-
mitment to maintain the global jihadist movement. They may fight in the company of nationally based 
insurgencies, but they are not personally connected to the local conflict dynamics and will travel to seek 
opportunities to supplant the governance of weak states.50 
Armed Group Careers & Leadership: Personnel 
Management & Career Progression
There has been less research to date on the fate of individual foreign fighters. The historical record indi-
cates high casualty rates among foreign fighters, who are often used as cannon fodder by local rebel 
commanders or are extremely ideological and volunteer for suicide missions.51 Those who survive and 
remain ideologically committed are likely to be formidable insurgents.  Mendelsohn notes that high casu-
alty rates among foreign fighters produce a kind of Darwinian selection, so that “only a relatively small 
group of experienced operatives ends up assuming leading positions in one of the active jihadist fronts.”52 
Studies of armed groups reference the importance of mid-level commanders in maintaining cohesion 
over rank and file members, but they offer few guideposts for navigating the group hierarchies or dis-
tinguishing different levels of leadership. Similarly, while research has focused on leadership in terrorist 
and rebel organizations, it is difficult to find definitions of leadership and standards for differentiating 
top from middle leaders or lower-ranking officers. While some studies of leadership and personnel man-
agement in armed groups discuss career progression within organizations in terms of individuals rising 
through ranks—from muscle to brains—it is rare to find any coding system to define this career progres-
sion.53 This gap means that it is difficult to measure how individuals rise within armed groups and how 
armed groups prioritize and reward skills and success in promoting members into leadership roles.
Outside of terrorism studies, business management literature also rarely ever defines middle manage-
ment. For example, “middle management is the intermediate leadership level of a hierarchical organiza-
49 Tricia Bacon and Daniel Milton, “Crashing the Party? The Impact of Foreign Fighters on Terrorist Group Behavior,” Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, (2019): 3, 21.
50 Clarke, After the Caliphate, xi, 2, 6. Also see Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma, 2004: 313, for the argument that 
“neofundamentalist” jihadists seek out failed states and conflict zones to try to establish governance because they do not believe they 
enjoy enough support to supplant institutions in functional societies.  
51 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 197-198, 208-209.
52 Mendelsohn, Foreign Fighters – Recent Trends, 195.
53 Michael D. Mumford et al., “Development of Leadership Skills: Experience and Timing,” Psychology Faculty Publications (Omaha: Uni-
versity of Nebraska, 2000), 64; Brian J. Phillips, “How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect Violence? The Case of Drug Trafficking Orga-
nizations in Mexico,” Journal of Politics 77, no. 2 (2015); Judith Verweijen and Claude Iguma Wakenge, “Understanding Armed Group 
Proliferation in the Eastern Congo,” Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper (2015).
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tion, being subordinate to the senior management but above the lowest levels of operational staff.”54 In 
the absence of more stringent definitions to apply to the study of armed group management and ranking 
structures, it is difficult to understand how individual members progress through the ranks and their lines 
of authority. Most do not appear to have adopted a full series of gradation in rank akin to rankings of 
regular military personnel. For example, Themner describes mid-level commanders of non-state armed 
groups as “the category of military personnel that was previously situated between the rank-and-file 
combatants and the highest military leadership, and who personally led their subordinates in battle.”55 
Several studies of decapitation strategies in terrorism literature note the gaps that would emerge without 
effective leadership. Who fills leadership roles, how they get there, what authority they actually wield, 
and their impact on organizational growth and sustainability, however, is less clear. Jordan asserts that 
charismatic individuals are typically “more directly responsible for planning and recruitment.”56 Without 
providing examples of formal tiers of rank, Abrahms and Potter contend that senior leadership is gen-
erally composed of the “oldest” members of the group, while foot soldiers or low-level operatives are 
typically among the “newest.”57 Shapiro, however, further argues that low-level operatives can be more 
difficult to manage. Not only do they lack ideological indoctrination, their lack of experience coupled 
with their desire to rise through the ranks can result in less cautious behavior and more aggressive, per-
formative acts.58 This lack of alignment between top leadership and low-level operatives produces what 
he terms “the terrorist’s dilemma”.59 
With regard to career foreign fighters, the literature is even less clear. If the same holds true for career 
foreign fighters, we can expect that the longer their careers and the higher they rise, the less directly 
involved in violence and more responsible for planning or directing attacks they become. However, the 
extent to which they are able to reach these roles and exert control over or establish coherence within 
the groups they join remains somewhat of a mystery.
54 Lumen (Accessed October 8, 2019) Boundless Management. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-management/chapter/
management-levels-and-types/.
55 Anders Themner, “Intermediaries of Peace or Agents of War: The Role of Ex-midlevel Commanders in Big Man Networks,” in African 
Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks, ed. Mats Utas (London: Zed Books, 2012), 220.
56 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 726, 728, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903369068.
57 Max Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter, “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics,” International Organization 69, 
no. 2 (2015): 316, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000411.
58 Ibid.
59 Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400848645.
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METHODOLOGY: IDENTIFYING CAREER FOREIGN 
FIGHTERS & DETERMINING RANKS
This study is limited to Sunni jihadists instead of all foreign fighters for two reasons. First, doing so cre-
ated an easily identifiable population instead of trying to identify anyone in history who served as a for-
eign fighter in different groups. Second, jihadists are prevalent across major modern conflicts both as a 
collective group and individuals. Sunni jihadists are often described as belonging to waves or generations 
defined by foreign fighter mobilizations: the 1980s Afghanistan war, the 1990s Al Qaeda-coordinated 
globalized insurgencies and training camps, the 2000s Iraq War, and the 2010s Syrian conflict.60 Each of 
those waves of foreign fighters networked with other members of their generation and facilitated their 
travel between conflicts, so it is particularly worthwhile to look for patterns over the decades within the 
jihadist movement.
We collected data between September 2018 and July 2019 through publicly available open source 
records. Because the data concerned Sunni jihadist foreign fighters, the population data extends to the 
formation of this cohort with the 1979 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With a scope of forty years, 
the number of potential jihadist career foreign fighters is unknown. An estimate of the total number of 
jihadist foreign fighters is also unknown and subject to much disagreement, although it is likely to be in 
the tens of thousands. 
Although it would be reasonable to expect to identify numerous foreign fighters, despite a thorough 
search of jihadist propaganda primary sources, media reports, and academic research, we were only able 
to positively identify a few dozen. Complicating research was scarce access to contemporaneous sources 
before the internet and social media. Such sources may have described early activities of the most senior 
career foreign fighters before they rose through the ranks, potentially differing from hagiographic official 
accounts extolling their leadership. At the same time, more famous figures—such as group leaders—are 
more likely to have generated records of their activities than others. This suggests there may be many 
individuals for whom there is no record of their career foreign fighting and that individuals who ascended 
the ranks may be over-represented.
Therefore, we acknowledge that the population of career foreign fighters described in this study is a 
small sample—it cannot be determined how representative it is. However, we expect that career foreign 
fighters would be a minority of jihadist foreign fighters, and that the dozens identified are a reflective 
sample size. For example, Cragin argues that “the relative size of Al Qaeda in its formative years tends to 
be over-emphasized,” and that there were likely only dozens of members among the Arab Afghans.61 If 
this is correct, then the approximately thirty career foreign fighters whom we identified as participating 
in that phase of the conflict is a reasonable sample. 
60 See Sageman, Leaderless Jihad; Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized: New Jihadists and Threats to the West (London: I.B. Taurus, 2016); 
Thomas F. Lynch III, Sunni and Shi ’a Terrorism: Differences that Matter (Washington, DC: Brookings Report, 2008).
61 Cragin, 1065. 
RESOLVE RESEARCH REPORT  |  CAREER FOREIGN FIGHTERS           13
Additionally, we note that many individuals in the dataset went by a number of names, aliases, or noms 
de guerre (kunyas), meaning that records of the same individual operating under different names had 
to be reconciled. At the same time, the same kunyas may be adopted by multiple individuals, so coding 
also required disaggregation through cross referencing. 
What Makes a “Career” in Foreign Fighting?
 This study introduces the category of “career foreign fighters”: individuals who served as foreign fighters 
in more than one insurgent group. We employ the term career in accordance with the Oxford English 
Dictionary: “an occupation undertaken for a significant period of a person’s life and with opportunities 
for progress.”62 There is no test of longevity in our definition of career, and we do not always have clear 
records of how long individuals were foreign fighters in particular locations. 
A Note on Fighter Roles
We do not distinguish which roles individuals performed for the insurgent groups. While the presence 
of individuals with ostensibly non-combatant roles in ISIS has produced some debates about whether 
non-combatants should be classified as foreign fighters, we contend that it is appropriate to do so 
because individuals who join regular armies are classified as military personnel regardless of whether 
they perform combat duties. Additionally, it is difficult to obtain accurate records of the activities of any 
foreign fighters, who are engaged in illegal activities under national and international laws.
A Note on Domestic Versus International Engagement
While we record whether career foreign fighters engaged in domestic extremist groups before or after for-
eign fighting, we do not count extremist membership as part of their careers, only serial foreign fighting. 
Presumably most foreign fighters were active to one degree or another in domestic networks. Informa-
tion about their militant activity pre-foreign fighting is important for developing profiles of who becomes 
foreign fighters. However, it does not reflect the choices by jihadists to remain foreign fighters instead 
of returning home, decisions to switch from one conflict to another, or from one group to another, and 
whether this accumulation of battlefield experience changes their role in jihadist insurgencies beyond 
their states of origin. Further research in that regard is needed.
A Note on Career Foreign Fighter Career “Success”
We presume that foreign fighters want and have the opportunity for progression to leadership positions 
in jihadist groups, but we do not classify them as having had a successful career if they rise to senior 
leadership. Nor do we say that they did not have a career in foreign fighting if they did not become senior 
leaders. As in any vocation, some people can remain in the operational side of organizations for their 
entire career without becoming management.
62 “Career,” Lexico, powered by the Oxford English Dictionary, accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.lexico.com/definition/career.
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In keeping with the literature on senior and middle management in armed groups, we identified ranks, 
or leadership levels, to indicate whether tenure in a career as a foreign fighter leads to progression 
in insurgent organizations. We delineated ranks of executive, midlevel, and operational roles (Table 1). 
Executives are the top individuals leading an organization or regional affiliate. Midlevel are all others who 
command other fighters, including military, terrorist operations and religious authority. Operational are 
the bottom level of foot soldiers. Executive is used instead of senior, and operational instead of junior, 
to avoid equating the length of time spent as a foreign fighter with the level of responsibility within the 
insurgent organizations. Our findings demonstrate that some individuals do remain at the operational 
level despite participating in multiple insurgencies, while others begin their foreign fighter careers in 
positions of authority.
Table 1: Career Foreign Fighter Ranks
FINDINGS
We identified 54 jihadist foreign fighters in multiple groups between 1980 and the present day. Most of 
them served in multiple civil wars but some were foreign fighters in different groups in the same theater 
of conflict. All career foreign fighters served with at least two insurgent groups. The largest number of 
groups we recorded for one career foreign fighter was six.63
Overall, the 54 career foreign fighters we examined participated in an average of 2.4 conflicts and served 
with an average of 2.4 different groups (with a median of 3 conflicts and 2 different groups). There was 
little difference in number of conflicts between ranks of career foreign fighters, with executives averag-
ing 2.8 conflicts and groups, compared to 2.2 for both midlevel and operational career foreign fighters 
(Figure 1).
63 Samir Saleh Abdullah (Ibn al-Khattab) served in at least six groups in five different conflicts.
Executive Executives are the top individuals leading an organization or regional affiliate.
Mid-level Midlevel are all others who command other fighters, including mili-tary, terrorist operations and religious authority.
Operational Operational are the bottom level of foot soldiers. 
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Figure 1: Career Foreign Fighters by Groups and Conflicts 
Conflicts & Career Fighters: Launching Pads & Magnets 
The conflicts in which career foreign fighters appeared indicate interesting trends (see Figure 2 for a list 
of conflicts appearing in the dataset). Many of the jihadists who have fought in multiple insurgencies 
and made names (kunyas) for themselves were active for the longest lengths of time. Therefore, career 
foreign fighters were most active in early jihadist wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia. The conflict in Syria, 
which has the most foreign fighters, has not yet generated many fighters who have traveled on to fight in 
another conflict. Career foreign fighters in the Syria data represent individuals who have switched among 
groups fighting within that conflict. 
Disaggregating data on the first time serving and subsequent jihadist conflicts in foreign fighter careers 
shows that some conflicts have launched far more foreign fighters into careers than others. Afghanistan 
was the first foreign jihad for half of the career foreign fighters in our data set. In contrast, other desti-
nations for career foreign fighters, such as Russia and the Philippines, appear to almost exclusively have 
career jihadists in their second or later journeys. Some conflicts, therefore, appear to bleed out more 
foreign fighters to other conflicts, while others attract experienced jihadists, but fail to launch the careers 
of newer, or more novice foreign fighters (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Conflicts in the Dataset with Career Foreign Fighter Participation
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Playing the Field: Advancing Careers by Switching Groups
In terms of individual progression, many career foreign fighters climb in the ranks as they serve across 
multiple groups. Most executive leadership began as operational rank and file militants. The majority of 
operational level foreign fighters ascend in rank over the course of their careers across different groups. A 
small minority of executive and midlevel leadership began their careers in command positions, but those 
cases were exceptions based mostly on the individual’s hereditary connection to other jihadist leaders. 
In Figure 4 we see that most foreign fighters (46 of the 54 we identified) start at the bottom of their orga-
nizations, in the third tier of conducting operations. Of these, more than half ascended to midlevel (14) 
or to executive (12) leadership. In all, just over half of all career foreign fighters fought with more than 
one group and advanced to higher leadership positions as they moved.




Number of Career Foreign Fighters
Presumably, operatives who gain experience are bigger security threats to society, and those who ascend 
to midlevel and executive leadership do so because their comrades recognize their effectiveness. Con-
sidering that foreign fighters are usually treated as cannon fodder by local insurgent commanders and 
invariably conflict with local fighters, the ability to thrive as a foreign fighter and ascend in new organiza-
tions indicates particularly effective militancy.64 
64 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 201.
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Experience Matters: Previous Domestic Engagement 
An examination of the careers of jihadists beyond foreign fighting yields interesting results (Figure 5). 
The biggest difference between top, middle, and bottom level career foreign fighters is in their domestic 
militant activities prior to becoming foreign fighters. While few at the operational level had prior experience 
as domestic militants, about one-third of executives and more than half of midlevel commanders did. 




























This study does not capture how pre-foreign fighting experience affected the careers of the jihadists, but 
these results raise an intriguing question: did experience with domestic militancy lead to command posi-
tions abroad for foreign fighters? The typical assumption is that individuals become foreign fighters to 
gain battlefield experience that they can then use at home as returnees. However, our findings in Figure 
4 indicate that the expertise may flow in the other direction: individuals may earn positions of command 
in foreign insurgencies because they already had training or experience at home. It may be that the most 
dangerous domestic militants are traveling to become the most dangerous foreign fighters, not the other 
way around. Further research on this possibility is needed.  
Returning Career Foreign Fighters: Assessing the threat
Whether career foreign fighters become greater threats by virtue of growing expertise and influence is 
part of evaluating the potential threat of returnees and whether they should be repatriated or prevented 
from coming back to countries of origin. Presumably career foreign fighters are the most committed 
to their cause regardless of whether they become more dangerous with more experience. Only a few, 
mostly from the fractious Syrian conflict, switched between rival groups in the same theater of conflict.
The data indicates that just over one-third of career foreign fighters become returnees who engage in ter-
rorist plots in their home countries. While from a limited sample, this finding indicates that career foreign 
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fighters are more likely to pose security threats than average jihadist foreign fighters, of whom eleven to 
less than one percent are liable to engage in plots as returnees.65 Career foreign fighter returnees have 
been arrested for domestic activity in Western, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian countries, 
indicating that national responses are not the determining factor in whether they remain engaged. 
In our sample, there were 15 career foreign fighters with prior militant experience, and 21 who became 
returnee terrorists. 14 of the 21 career foreign fighter returnees had ascended to leadership roles, but 
there was little overlap between those who had been domestic militants before foreign fighting and 
those who continued after returning. Just six fighters were active before and after being foreign fighters; 
three were executive leadership and three were midlevel. Thus, it appears that career fighters with prior 
domestic experience make contributions to foreign fighter insurgencies, but career foreign fighters who 
become returnee terrorists are a different group who had little prior experience to begin with. While 
some domestic terrorists may seek to become foreign fighters to gain experience to use in their home 
countries—the data indicates that almost no career foreign fighters follow this trajectory.
THE IMPACT OF CAREER EXECUTIVES: THREE 
CASE STUDIES
In efforts to fill a gap in existing literature on leadership positions, authority, and impact in terrorism stud-
ies, this section compares three different career foreign fighters who rose through the ranks to become 
executive leaders of insurgent groups in foreign countries. While each had prior ties to the Saudi jihadist 
movement that facilitated their becoming foreign fighters in Afghanistan, each subsequently established 
themselves in leadership roles in multiple different locations by trading on their foreign fighting exper-
tise. However, their influences took on different forms, demonstrating the multiple ways career foreign 
fighters have shaped the global jihadist movement.
Samir bin Salih bin ‘Addullah al-Suwaylim
Khattab’s competitive advantage established throughout his career as a foreign fighter allowed him to 
ascend the ranks and hold more influence with each subsequent armed group.
65 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign 
Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 1–15; Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “The Foreign Fighters’ Threat: What 
History Can(not) Tell Us”, Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (2014): 64; Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser, “Assessing the Islamic 
State’s Commitment to Attacking the West,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 30, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000615..
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Overview
Samir bin Salih bin `Addullah al-Suwaylim (known by the kunya Ibn al-Khattab or Emir Khattab), has been 
described by the Combating Terrorism Center as “an international jihadist par excellence.”66 Originally 
born in Saudi Arabia, Khattab fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1988-1994. He subsequently 
joined jihadists in Bosnia and Azerbaijan and in the civil war in Tajikistan in 1994-1995. He ultimately trav-
eled to Russia, operating in Dagestan briefly before ending up in Chechnya between 1995-2002, where 
he eventually died in a covert Russian assassination plot.67  
Early Beginnings
Khattab left his native Saudi Arabia at the age 18 to fight in Afghanistan with Maktab al-Khidmat lil Muja-
hidin, the Services Bureau for Mujahidin established by Abdullah Azzam for foreign fighters. Khattab evi-
dently already had ties to transnational networks because he carried letters of recommendation signed 
by a member of the Saudi led chapter of Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahidin and by the head of the Saudi 
Red Crescent organization in Pakistan.68 
Career Trajectory
Khattab ultimately operated as a career foreign fighter for fourteen years. He ascended as executive 
leader of the International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade, a foreign fighter group operating in the Cau-
casus. In his memoir, Memories of Amir Khattab, Khattab described the knowledge and experiences he 
acquired in each conflict. In Afghanistan, he notes that there were numerous problems between the 
Afghans and the ansar (foreign fighters), with each group blaming the other for their mishaps. “I remem-
ber after every operation there would be problems and they would look for a scapegoat and put the 
problems on someone’s back. Really there was no studying and order in the case of entering [combat].”69 
According to Khattab, many of these issues stemmed from the foreign fighters being a burden on the 
local population. They would enter a conflict with the intentions of helping locals but would end up 
requesting assistance from them. This became a common theme: “there is no difference in the battles of 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, or elsewhere” he lamented, “fighting is fighting brothers, the 
Ansar brothers who should come to support and help the people became a burden, they come to the 
field and ask for help from the people who need help?! [sic]”70 




69 Samir Saleh al-Suwailem (n.d.), “Memories of Amir Khattab: The Experience of the Arab Ansar in Chechnya, Afghanistan & Tajikistan,” 
Translated by Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum, accessed June 20, 2019. https://archive.org/details/TheMemoriesOfAmirKhattabTh-
eExperienceOfTheArabAnsarInChechnya: 4-8.
70 Ibid.
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By the time Khattab reached Tajikistan he was regarded highly enough based on prior exploits that he 
could offer organizational advice to local commanders to help avoid conflicts with the foreign fighter 
contingent. As Khattab recalled, “to avoid all kinds of problems we prepared ourselves for Tajikistan.” 
He advised Abdulloh Nuri, leader of the Tajik rebels, in accordance with Abdullah Azzam’s philosophy, 
that the foreign fighters were there to offer aid and support, but they were not “masters in the field of 
military operations and jihad.”71 However, despite any reduced frictions with foreign volunteers, the local 
forces were not successful in Tajikistan, and Khattab moved on to Russia itself.
Career Culmination
Dagestani jihadists criticized Khattab for his intentions to fight with the Chechens, whom they regarded 
as simultaneously communists, Sufis, and polytheists. Nevertheless, Khattab maintained that he would 
be effective in training individual militants, instructing them in both insurgent tactics and the Salafi creed: 
“Our creed is not just words, its [sic] words and action.”72 Allowing actions to speak louder than words 
would change the contours of the Chechen war, introducing jihadist ideology and tactics honed on prior 
battlefields and transforming a nationalist struggle for sovereignty into a front in a global religious war.73 
Reportedly, Khattab positioned himself as the “leader of the Arab Ansar in Chechnya,” using “his own 
resources and funds”74 to found the International Islamic Brigade (IIB),75 which, according to some reports, 
had up to 300 Afghan-Arab career foreign fighters.76 He spent years influencing the political and military 
culture of  the rebels through his experience and transnational ties as a career foreign fighter.77 As exec-
utive leader, he put his own stamp on recruitment, basing his efforts on the successful training program 
he had been part of in Afghanistan. In 1995,78 Khattab, along with Abu Fatqh a fellow jihadist, founded 
the Kavkaz training camp near Serzhen-Yurt, a Chechen village in the Shali region.79 It provided military 
training to 1,000-2,000 recruits who attended the camp for 45 days to six months.80 A growth in foreign 
trainees in the camp coincided with increasingly fundamentalist religious underpinnings of the training.81 
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, “Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU,” Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program (2006) accessed June 12, 2019, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30281/14_Islam_Radi-
calisim_Central_Asia.pdf.
74 Al-`Ubaydi, “Khattab,” 2.
75 George Garner, “Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution of Nationalism to Jihad and Beyond,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 
25, no. 3 (2013): 419-34, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.664202; Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, “Islamic 
Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU.” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program (2006), 
accessed on July 1, 2019, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30281/14_Islam_Radicalisim_Central_Asia.pdf.
76 Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains: Politics and Warfare in the Caucasus (London: I.B. Taurus, 1998), 152-53.
77 Al-`Ubaydi, “Khattab.”
78 Elena Pokalova, Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 
2015).
79 Ekaterina Sokirianskaya. “State and Violence in Chechnya (1997-1999),” In Chechnya at War and Beyond, eds. Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin, 
Amandine Regamey, Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (London, New York: Routledge, 2014), 93-118, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315798318-6.
80 Ibid.
81 Elena Pokalova, “Islamic Radicalization in Russia’s North Caucasus: Lessons from Russia’s Handling of Religious Revival,” Journal of Balkan 
and Near Eastern Studies, 21, no. 2 (2019): 146-69, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2017.1367587.
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Under Khattab’s leadership, the Chechens’ instructors became primarily foreigners, Arabic-speakers 
working with Dagestani translators. “Thus, thanks to Khattab, thousands of young people gained access 
to a rather sophisticated and advanced ideological and military training in international Jihad,”82 which 
did not necessarily affect the first Chechen War, but influenced the development of the insurgent move-
ment in the country thereafter.83 The transformation in the Chechen insurgency occurred because of the 
growth of the jihadist movement there, and Khattab was able to foster it because of his prior experience, 
reputation, and connections to the global jihad movement. But it was not simply ideology or connections 
that were the basis of Khattab’s leadership; he had those same attributes when he first became a foreign 
fighter. Khattab’s competitive advantage established throughout his career as a foreign fighter allowed 
him to ascend the ranks and hold more influence with each subsequent armed group. 
Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin
Effective career foreign fighters can transmit their expertise beyond the groups they lead and influence 
the entire transnational network.
Overview
Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin (kunyas Abu Hajir al-Najdi and Abu Hazim) was a Saudi national who spent close 
to half of his life rising through the ranks of global jihad. Sixteen of these years were spent linked to 
al-Qaeda in some capacity.84 After participating in multiple conflicts including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Alge-
ria, Somalia, and Yemen, he eventually became the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),85 
returning to his home-country to help orchestrate high-profile attacks within the Saudi Kingdom. 
Al-Muqrin was responsible for the bombing of a Riyadh housing complex that killed seventeen people 
in 2003.86 In 2004, in an audio message on behalf of his group, he claimed responsibility for the 25-hour 
assault on the al-Khobar compound that killed twenty-two people and injured twenty-five.87 Also in 2004, 
82 Ibid., 107.
83 Pokalova, Chechnya’s Terrorist Network.
84 Norman Cigar, “Overview and Analysis,” in Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerrilla 
War (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc. 2009), 8.
85 Lawrence Joffe, “Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin: Al-Qaida mastermind behind Saudi Killings,” The Guardian, June 20, 2004, https://www.theguard-
ian.com/news/2004/jun/21/guardianobituaries.alqaida. 
86 “Profile: Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin,” BBC News, June 19, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3821237.stm. 
87 “Gunmen ‘Killed 22’ in Saudi City,” BBC News, May 30, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3762423.stm. 
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under al-Muqrin’s leadership, his group kidnapped and killed Paul Johnson, a Lockheed Martin employee 
stationed in Saudi Arabia, with images and a video of Johnson’s brutal beheading posted on the internet.88 
Reportedly, his efforts to dispose of Johnson led to al-Murqin’s killing,89 evidence that operational roles 
always carry the highest risks, even for leadership.
Early Beginnings
Before his short tenure as the leader of AQAP in Saudi Arabia, al-Muqrin began his career in Afghanistan 
in 1990, leaving school at the age of seventeen to join the jihad90 against his parents’ wishes.91 He learned 
the use of weaponry in the al-Faruq training camp and eventually became an instructor for Arab recruits, 
gaining the nickname “Mr. Nasty” due to his tough treatment of pupils.92 Afghanistan is where al-Muqrin 
is claimed to have made connections with Osama bin Laden, which embedded him in the transnational 
jihadist network.93 
Career Trajectory
After a short period back home in Saudi Arabia, al-Muqrin traveled to Algeria, smuggling arms from Spain 
to Morocco, later joining Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) until most of the members of his cell were arrest-
ed.94 Throughout his years in jihad, Saudi Arabia functioned as a transitioning point for al-Muqrin’s travels 
between conflicts zones. After leaving Algeria, he traveled between Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan before 
moving on to Bosnia where he instructed militants in a training camp and supported the local Muslim 
community in combat.95 From Bosnia, via Saudi Arabia and Yemen, al-Muqrin went to Somalia where he 
fought against Ethiopian troops in Ogaden.96 He was later captured and spent over two years in an Ethi-
opian prison before being extradited to Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, he faced four more years in prison 
but was released after two for displaying good conduct and memorizing the Quran.97     
Career Culmination
A former militant and acquaintance of al-Muqrin described him as a reckless young man, who lacked reli-
gious expertise and was not interested in learning.98 However, accounts describe him as developing more 
extreme views and devotion to militant jihad after his years of imprisonment.99 Much of this devotion 
88 Joffe, “Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.”
89 “Al Qaeda Militants Kill American Hostage,” CNN, June 19, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/18/saudi.kidnap/; “Mili-
tants Behead US Hostage,” BBC News, June 18, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3820495.stm. 
90 Joffe, “Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin”; “Al Muqrin: Al-Qaeda’s Angel of Death,” Asharq al-Awsat, June 20, 2005, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/
theaawsat/features/al-muqrin-al-qaedas-angel-of-death. 
91 Ibid.
92 “Al Muqrin: Al-Qaeda’s Angel of Death.” 
93 Joffe “Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.”
94 Cigar, “Overview and Analysis,” 7.  
95 Joffe, “Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin”; Cigar, “Overview and Analysis.”
96 Cigar, “Overview and Analysis.”
97 “Al Muqrin: Al-Qaeda’s Angel of Death”; Cigar, “Overview and Analysis.”
98 “Al Muqrin: Al-Qaeda’s Angel of Death.”
99 Cigar, “Overview and Analysis.”
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stemmed from changes he saw in local society, anger over the U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula, 
and what he perceived as aggression towards the Muslim community in the US.100
Upon release from Saudi prison in 2001, later that year al-Muqrin traveled back to Afghanistan and 
fought against American forces in the aftermath of 9/11, until he finally returned to Saudi Arabia in 2002, 
later becoming the leader of the local branch of AQAP.101 
Broader Impact
In addition to his leadership roles as a career foreign fighter, al-Muqrin is best known for his contribution 
to tactical strategy as the author of Guerrilla War, a text promulgating the operational and doctrinal 
philosophies of AQAP.102 Apart from its tactical instructions and Maoist theory, Guerrilla War provides 
insight on the use of the environment and local populations to conduct a successful insurgency. This 
includes being adaptable to local situations, developing trust among the people, while actively shaping 
local conditions to launch an effective insurgency.103 
Al-Muqrin also addresses lessons learned from previous conflicts he participated in, along with experi-
ences from other prominent jihadists, including Khattab. He observes that “factors that help promote 
a protracted war include avoiding some targets that the mujahidin could strike, because were they to 
attack them, they would lose the majority of their cadres and organizational structure,” which is what 
“happened in Tajikistan” under the “mujahidin led by Khattab.”104 As a theoretician, Al-Muqrin applied 
his experience from the previous theaters of conflict, along with lessons learned from fellow foreign 
fighter jihadists, to create a manual for successful insurgencies in the future. Al-Muqrin’s case illustrates 
that effective career foreign fighters can transmit their expertise beyond the groups they lead and influ-
ence the entire transnational network.
Abu ‘Abdel al-Aziz Barbaros
Al-Aziz demonstrated the impact of recognized career foreign fighters across transnational networks.
100 Ibid.
101 Cigar, “Overview and Analysis”; “Al Muqrin: Al-Qaeda’s Angel of Death”; and Joffe, “Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.”
102 Ibid.
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Overview
Abu ‘Abdel al-Aziz (kunyas Emir Barbaros, Barbarossa, and Abdel Rahman al-Dosari), was born in the 
Indian subcontinent, but was also a Saudi national who began his career with the mujahidin in Afghan-
istan.105 Before becoming a foreign fighter, he worked for Saudi Airlines and conducted Islamic lectures 
around the Gulf, employing rhetoric that did not shy away from confronting the Saudi government that 
he viewed as corrupt.106 
Early Beginnings
Al-Aziz reported that he decided to travel to Afghanistan around 1984 to answer the call of Abdullah 
Azzam.107 As a foreign fighter, he acquired the nickname “Hown” due to his skills with Russian manufac-
tured “Hound” artillery rockets. He also developed ties with other Afghan-Arabs fighting with connected 
groups in the region.108 While he never outwardly discussed his connection with al Qaeda, it is believed 
that al-Aziz was linked directly to group members including Osama bin Laden.109 Al-Aziz recalled his time 
in Afghanistan as “a great experience.” He maintained that those participating in the conflict had a strong 
“desire that Allah would keep them engaged in Jihad until their death and that Allah would give them 
their death in the battlefield of Jihad.”110 
Career Trajectory
Apart from Afghanistan, al-Aziz participated in conflicts in Kashmir, the Philippines, and traveled to strat-
egize with militants around Africa,111 but little is recorded about his activities. He traveled to Bosnia after 
the mujahidin conquest of Kabul in April 1992, becoming one of the initial Afghan-Arabs to participate in 
the Bosnian conflict.112 In part because of al-Aziz’s reports, Bosnia was deemed a “legitimate holy war” 
and became a first destination for the Afghan-Arabs to begin their careers in foreign fighting.113 Efforts to 
recruit, fund, and support the conflict in Bosnia began, and al-Aziz was named the first emir (command-
er-in-chief) of the Afghan-Arabs in the Bosnia.114      
105 New debate on the nom de guerre Abdel Rahman al-Dosari, associated with al-Aziz has surfaced. While a number of sources connect 
the name with al-Aziz, in The Universal Enemy (2020), Darryl Li argues that al-Dosari is a different person. While this argument may be 
valid, we have decided to note this discrepancy, keeping the name within our research, since it has no effect on our overall findings or 
the biographical information we present on al-Aziz.  
106 Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2004).
107 See: “The Bosnian Jihad: An interview with Abu Abdel Aziz Barbaros,” Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum, accessed on July 1, 2019, 
Retrieved from http://www.dafz.org/news/the-bosnian-jihad-an-interview-with-abu-abdel-aziz-barbaros/. 
108 Ibid.
109 Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe.
110 Ahmed Waseem, “The Jihad in Bosnia,” Al-Daawah (Islamabad, January 1993).
111 “The Bosnian Jihad” and “Help from The Holy Warriors,” Newsweek, October 4, 1992, https://www.newsweek.com/
help-holy-warriors-199918. 
112 Maria Galperin Donnelly, Thomas M. Sanderson, and Zack Fellman (n.d.) “Case Studies in History: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya,” For-
eign Fighters in History, Center for Strategic & International Studies, accessed on July 12, 2019, http://foreignfighters.csis.org/history/
case-studies.html. 
113 Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, 18.
114 Ibid.
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Career Culmination
Initially, Bosnian locals seemed to welcome al-Aziz and his foreign fighter contingent. Newsweek reported 
that “when mujahedin commander Aziz drives through Mehurici in his new black four-wheel-drive Nis-
san, the town turns out for him, children wave, old people turn and smile, and other villagers approach 
with invitations to weddings and parties.”115 However, this enthusiasm soon evaporated when foreign 
fighter groups failed to acknowledge truces between the Bosnian Army and Croatian militias, attacked 
UN and NATO peacekeepers, called for “total jihad,” and began spreading Wahhabism, which at the time 
was a foreign doctrine in the region.116 
Adding a jihadist angle to the separatist wars in the Balkans, al-Aziz was clear about his belief that the 
jihad should expand from Afghanistan to Bosnia. His argument that “it is then our (religious) duty to 
defend our Muslim brethren wherever they are, as long as they are persecuted” reflected similar beliefs 
to Abdullah Azzam’s defense of the Ummah (Muslim community worldwide).117 
Broader Impact
While he proselytized to civilians part-time, al-Aziz stated that his main purpose was to “bring men” to 
the conflict,118 which included training fighters in a camp in Mehurici, near central Bosnia.119 Al-Aziz con-
tributed to the expansion of training camps internationally and to the establishment of training programs 
for Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kunar in 1993.120 He also engaged in outreach and fundraising in the United States 
at Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) conferences.121 As such, al-Aziz demonstrated the impact of 
recognized career foreign fighters across transnational networks.  
Discussion: The Rise & Influence of Career Executives
The experiences of Khattab, al-Muqrin, and al-Aziz illustrate the influence that career foreign fighters 
have beyond their roles in the conflicts they initially travel to join. Khattab and al-Aziz leveraged trans-
national networks to transform local insurgencies into branches of the global jihadist movement. Both 
incorporated best practices from prior conflicts into the doctrines of the subsequent groups they led. 
Additionally, al-Aziz worked to transmit organizational learning to other insurgencies, while al-Muqrin 
115 “Help from The Holy Warriors.” 
116 Brian Glyn Williams (2007) Allah’s foot soldiers: An assessment of the role of foreign fighters and al-Qa’ida in the Chechen insurgency, in 
Moshe Gammer (ed.) “Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Routledge, 2007), 159.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe.
120	 Thomas	Hegghammer,	“Violent	Islamism	in	Saudi	Arabia,	1979-2006:	The	Power	and	Perils	of	Pan-Islamic	Nationalism”;	Institut	dʹEtudes	
Politiques de Paris, ECOLE DOCTORALE DE SCIENCES PO Programme Doctoral Monde Musulman Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Inter-
nationales, Doctorat de Sciences Politiques (2007), 642, accessed on July 18, 2019, https://hegghammer.files.wordpress.com/2019/07/
hegghammer-thesis-violent-islamism-in-saudi-arabia.pdf. 
121 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Salafism in America: History, Evolution, Radicalization (Washington, DC: George Washington University’s 
Program on Extremism, 2018), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Salafism%20in%20America.pdf; Kohlmann, Al-Qa-
ida’s Jihad in Europe.
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developed a written doctrine to disseminate to other groups. While all became prominent executive 
leaders of foreign fighter groups, they each rose to top leadership in different conflict zones, advancing 
their career by promoting best practices from previous foreign fighting experience and using different 
means and channels, including personal connections, financial resources, proselytizing, and building 
names for themselves in global jihadists networks.  
CONCLUSION: NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE 
SUCCESS
Outlined in this report, the available data indicates that career foreign fighters have had an outsized 
impact on the global militant jihadist movement. Despite lacking local ties, they build on transnational 
networks of ideological and material support, which they add to the resources of the groups they join. 
They also benefit from prior experiences, both practical knowledge and reputational effects. Many use 
this legitimacy to prove themselves valuable to their new groups and earn higher levels of command.
What’s in a Career?
Career foreign fighters defy the conventional picture of foreign fighters as inexperienced dilettantes who 
are of no use to the rebel groups they join except as cannon fodder. Many of these individuals, particularly 
those at midlevel leadership, arrive with prior active membership in domestic militant groups. Future 
studies should attempt to evaluate whether foreign fighter recruits bring in more skills from domestic 
terrorist groups than returnees bring back to domestic groups.
Impact Beyond the Battlefield 
Furthermore, career foreign fighters pass on valuable insights and best practices to subsequent groups 
they join. It has been noted that groups such as al Qaeda and the self-proclaimed  Islamic State learn 
from past mistakes—the risk of losing popular support by failing to provide services to civilians, for one.122 
However, this assumes that the group, primarily, is responsible for organizational learning. Organizations 
are not sentient, they do not set their own agendas but, rather, are comprised of individuals and leaders 
who make choices on their behalf. The evidence presented here suggests that key individuals, including 
career foreign fighters, rise to leadership because of their past experience. Those individuals then use 
that experience to identify shortcomings and develop institutions and doctrines to ameliorate them. 
Consequently, career foreign fighters have played a vital role in transmitting learning across jihadist orga-
nizations, and, therefore, in the evolution of those organizations as well.
122 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Ecco, 2015), 62.
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Domestic Versus International Career Tracks
Our findings indicate that career foreign fighter trajectories may vary based on the conflict. The jihadist 
diaspora that emerged from the Afghanistan war produced career foreign fighters who flocked to differ-
ent battlefields. Similarly, some of the large number of foreign fighters who joined the Syrian civil war 
have already become career foreign fighters. Unlike Afghanistan, however, Syrian foreign fighter careers 
have not been built on jumping between different foreign conflicts, but a result of having switched alle-
giances between competing groups within Syria itself. Time will tell whether Syrian career foreign fight-
ers export their knowledge and skills elsewhere. 
Leadership & Evolution 
Based on past trends, new career foreign fighters will rise in the ranks of subsequent insurgent groups 
and many will become the top leaders of their own organizations. Our sample of a few dozen career for-
eign fighters does not permit us to conclude that most foreign fighters who do not return home advance 
to organizing plots and leading groups. But it does appear that many of those who move on instead of 
returning home are able to parlay their resumes into foreign fighter careers. We also identified evidence 
that once in leadership positions, career jihadist foreign fighters communicate and cooperate with insur-
gent groups in other conflicts to try to help them evolve.
Returning Career Foreign Fighters
While a significant proportion have returned to become domestic terrorists, career foreign fighters cre-
ate bigger security challenges by fortifying insurgencies elsewhere and successfully shaping the jihadist 
movement internationally. The likelihood that future career foreign fighters will make similar contribu-
tions to insurgencies and terrorist networks worldwide factors into the debate about the need to repatri-
ate and prosecute foreign fighters. Career foreign fighters have significant local impacts on civil wars they 
join during subsequent travels, but their highly developed transnational networks ensure their influence 
worldwide. 
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